Gestión política y potencial de autogobierno: la acción colectiva para el desarrollo

Sergio Colin-Castillo; David Morales-González

doi:10.22201/fesa.figuras.2021.2.3.160

Authors

Sergio Colin-Castillo Autonomous University of Coahuila (MX) https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2262-2375
David Morales-González National Autonomous University of Mexico (MX) https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1565-7868

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22201/fesa.figuras.2021.2.3.160

Keywords:

Self-government, Collective Action, Common-Pool Resources, Leadership, Political Parties

Abstract

The formation of self-government for the collective control and management of natural resources faces many limitations, especially when it comes to Common-Pool Resources (CPR). One of the objectives of this work is to take up some theoretical references that detail certain economic, social, and political conditions, which will allow ex-ante evaluation of the potential success of self-government, by the means of identification and design of key indicators, a model of which there is no indication of application for the administration and management of the CPR. The methodological proposal presented here is complemented by the inclusion of the influence of political parties as a variable, relevant institutionalized actor in local or regional contexts for the use of common goods, generators of leadership that integrate shared objectives that have an impact on the achievement of collective action for the self-government of the CPRs.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Author Biographies

Sergio Colin-Castillo, Autonomous University of Coahuila

He is research professor at Centro de Investigaciones Socioeconomicas (CISE), Universidad Autónoma de Coahuila. SIN level I. He holds a Ph.D. in Agricultural Economics (Texas A&M University, USA), an M.Sc. in Applied Economics (El COLEF) and a bachelor’s degree in Agricultural Economics (Universidad A. Chapingo).

He has been working for more than 20 years in economics and environmental issues, firstly as a manager and analyst for Mexico’s government, consultant in Argentina, Ecuador, and Mexico. Then as researcher, being part of the academia in topics such as: Water Economy, Energy and Economics, Just Transition, Climate Change, Governance of Common-Pool Resources, Productivity and Efficiency, Economic Instruments, and Prices Analyses.

He has published diverse articles and presented his works in Mexico and abroad. He has been awarded with prices such as: 2nd Place in Concurso Nacional de Tésis de Doctorado (SOMAS), The Latin American and Caribbean Environmental Economics Program grant holder, and as a Fulbright-Garcia Robles fellowship holder. Currently, has served as a lecturer in Probability and Statistics, Environmental Economics, Water Economy, and Microeconometrics.
David Morales-González, National Autonomous University of Mexico

He holds a bachelor’s degree in Political Science, a MSc and Ph.D. in Social Studies, line of research in Political Processes by Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana. He holds a Master in Local Development by Instituto de Economía, Geografía y Demografía from CSIC, Spain as a Fundación Carolina fellowship holder.

He has been International Affairs and Descentralization Director at Instituto Nacional para el Federalismo y el Desarrollo Municipal (INAFED) from Secretaría de Gobernación. He served as a parliamentary advisor in Comisión de Desarrollo Metropolitano of LXIII Legislatura from Cámara de Diputados and has been electoral district counselor in Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE), and counselor in Consejo General del Instituto Electoral del Distrito Federal (IECM nowadays).

He has published a variety of electoral, political parties, planning and metropolitan development studies. He has directed provided guidance in Master and Ph.D. depositions, and delivered lectures, Diploma courses and conferences with regard to transparency, elections, techno-politics and government. Currently, he is professor in Political Science and Public Administration at FES Acatlán, UNAM; as well as the Master in Government and Public Affairs. He is part of Sistema Nacional de Investigadores from CONACyT as a candidate.

References

Anderies, John M., Marco A. Janssen, and Elinor Ostrom. 2004. “A Framework to Analyze the Robustness of Social-ecological Systems from an Institutional Perspective.” Ecology and Society 9 (1): 18.

Andrew, Neil L., Christophe Béné, Stephen J. Hall, Edward H. Allison, Simon Heck, and Blake D. Ratner. 2007. “Diagnosis and management of small-scale fisheries in developing countries.” Fish and Fisheries 8 (3): 227-240.

Banco Mundial. s.f. “México.” Índice de Gini. https://datos.bancomundial.org/...INI?locations=MX Revisado el 13 de abril, 2021.

______. s.f. Inflación, precios al consumidor (% anual). https://datos.bancomundial.org/...r/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG Revisado el 13 de abril, 2021.

Basurto, Xavier. 2005. “How Locally Designed Access and Use Controls Can Prevent the Tragedy of the Commons in a Mexican Small-Scale Fishing Community.” Society & Natural Resources 18 (7): 643-659.

______. 2008. “Biological and Ecological Mechanisms Supporting Marine Self-Governance: The Seri Callo de Hacha Fishery in Mexico.” Ecology and Society 13, no. 2 (December): 20-37.

Berkes, Fikret. 2006. “From Community-Based Resource Management to Complex Systems: The Scale Issue and Marine Commons.” Ecology and Society 11, no. 1 (June): 45.

Bobbio, Norberto. 1996. Estado, gobierno y sociedad. Por una teoría general de la política. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.

Canedo Vásquez, Gabriela. 2008. “Una conquista indígena. Reconocimiento de municipios por ‘usos y costumbres’ en Oaxaca (México).” En La economía política de la pobreza, compilado por Alberto Cimadamore. Buenos Aires: CLACSO.

Campbell, Richmond. 1985. “Background for the uninitiated.” In Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoner's dilemma and Newcomb's problem, edited by Richmond Campbell and Lanning Sowden, 3-44. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.

Clark, Colin W. 1980. “Restricted Access to Common-Property Fishery Resources: A Game Theoretic Analysis.” In Dynamic Optimization and Mathematical Economics, edited by Pan-Tai Liu, 117-130. Vol. 19. New York: Plenum Press.

Colin Castillo, Sergio, y David Morales. 2017. “La gestión política y el autogobierno: el potencial de la acción colectiva para el manejo comunitario de los recursos de uso común”. En XI Congreso de la Asociación Española de Economía Agraria. Sistemas alimentarios y cambio global desde el Mediterráneo, 57-59. Orihuela, Elche: Universidad Miguel Hernández. https://innovacionumh.es/...ECONOMIA%20AGRARIA.pdf Revisado el 12 de abril, 2021.

Colin Castillo, Sergio, y Richard T. Woodward. 2014. “Propuesta metodológica para medir el potencial de autogobierno.” Análisis Económico XXIX, no. 70 (enero-abril): 57-71. http://www.analisiseconomico.azc.uam.mx/...132/126 Revisado el 12 de abril, 2021.

Colin Castillo, Sergio, and Richard T. Woodward. 2015. "Measuring the potential for self-governance: An approach for the management of the common-pool resources.” International Journal of the Commons 9, no. 1 (March): 281-305. http://www.thecommonsjournal.org/...ticle/view/490 Revisado el 12 de abril, 2021.

Dawes, Robyn M. 1975. “Formal models of dilemmas in social decision-making.” In Human Judgment and Decision Processes, edited by Martin F. Kaplan and Steven Schwartz, 87-117. New York, San Francisco, London: Academic Press.

Degnbol, Poul, Henrik Gislason, Susan Hanna, Svein Jentoft, Jesper Raakjær Nielsen, Sten Sverdrup-Jensen, and Douglas Clyde Wilson. 2006. “Painting the floor with a hammer: Technical fixes in fisheries management.” Marine Policy 30, no. 5 (September): 534-543.

Dietz, Thomas, Elinor Ostrom, and Paul C. Stern. 2003. “The Struggle to Govern the Commons.” Science 302, no. 5652 (December): 1907-1912.

Eisenstadt, Todd A. 2007. "Usos y Costumbres and Postelectoral Conflicts in Oaxaca, Mexico, 1995-2004: An Empirical and Normative Assessment." Latin American Research Review 42 (1): 52-77.

Elder, Charles D., y Roger W. Cobb. 1993. “Formación de la agenda. El caso de la política de los ancianos.” En Problemas públicos y agenda de gobierno, editado por Luis F. Aguilar Villanueva. México: Miguel Ángel Porrúa (Colección Antologías de Política Pública, Tercera Antología).

Gautam, Ambika P., and Ganesh P. Shivakoti. 2005. “Conditions for Successful Local Collective Action in Forestry: Some Evidence From the Hills of Nepal.” Society & Natural Resources 18 (2): 153-171.

Gordon, H. Scott. 1954. “The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery.” In Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics, edited by Chennat Gopalakrishnan, 178-203. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Grafton, R. Quentin, James Kirkley, Tom Kompas, and Dale Squires. 2006. Economics for Fisheries Management. Hampshire, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited.

Grafton, R. Quentin, Ray Hilborn, Lori Ridgeway, Dale Squires, Meryl Williams, Serge Garcia, Theodore Groves, et al. 2008. “Positioning fisheries in a changing world.” Marine Policy 32, no. 4 (July): 630-634.

Grafton, R. Quentin, Tom Kompas, Richard McLoughlin, and Nick Rayns. 2007. “Benchmarking for fisheries governance.” Marine Policy 31, no. 4 (July): 470-479.

Hackett, Steven, Edella Schlager, and James Walker. 1994. “The Role of Communication in Resolving Commons Dilemmas: Experimental Evidence with Heterogeneous Appropriators.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 27, no. 2 (September): 99-126.

Hadorn, Gertrude Hirsch, Holger Hoffmann-Riem, Susette Biber-Klemm, Walter Grossenbacher-Mansuy, Dominique Joye, Christian Pohl, Urs Wiesmann, and Elisabeth Zemp, eds. 2008. Handbook of Transdisciplinary Research. Switzerland: Springer Netherlands.

Hanna, Susan. 1995. “Efficiencies of User Participation in Natural Resource Management.” In Property Rights and the Environment: Social and Ecological Issues, edited by Susan Hanna and Mohan Munasinghe. Washington, D.C.: The Beijer International Institute of Ecological-The World Bank.

Hardin, Garrett. 1968. “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Science 162, no. 3859 (December): 1243-1248.

Hilborn, Ray. 2007a. “Moving to Sustainability by Learning from Successful Fisheries.” Ambio 36, no. 4 (June): 296-303.

Hilborn. Ray. 2007b. “Reinterpreting the State of Fisheries and their Management.” Ecosystems 10: 1362-1369.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. El orden político en las sociedades en cambio. Buenos Aires: Paidós.

INEGI. 2019. Anuario estadístico y geográfico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos 2019. México: INEGI. https://www.inegi.org.mx/..._2019/702825192235.pdf Revisado el 13 de abril, 2021.

Jiménez Buedo, María, and Luis M. Miller. 2009. “Experiments in the Social Sciences: The relationship between External and Internal Validity.” Paper presented at the Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice, Minneapolis, Minnesota, June 2009.

Keefer, Philip. 2013. Organizing for Prosperity: Collective Action, Political Parties and the Political Economy of Development. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

Llyod, Willian Forster. 1977. “On the checks to population.” In Managing the Commons, edited by Garret Hardin and John Baden. San Francisco: Freeman and Company.

Mainwaring, Scott P. 1999. Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization. The Case of Brazil. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

May, Peter J. 1993. “Claves para diseñar opciones de políticas.” En Problemas públicos y agenda de gobierno, editado por Luis F. Aguilar Villanueva. México: Miguel Ángel Porrúa (Colección Antologías de Política Pública, Tercera Antología).

Merkl, Peter H. 1981. “La función legitimadora del líder (Konrad Adenauer, 1949-1976).” Revista de Estudios Políticos (Nueva Época), no. 21 (mayo-junio): 7-26.

Murphy, Albert J. 1958. “El estudio del proceso del liderazgo.” En Estudio de liderazgo, coordinado por C. G. Browne y Thomas S. Cohn. Buenos Aires: Paidós.

Olson, Mancur. 1971. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Second Printing with a New Preface and Appendix. Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press.

Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. New York: Cambridge University Press.

______. 1999. Self-Governance and Forest Resources. Bogor: Center for International Forestry Research.

______. 2005. Understanding Institutional Diversity. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

______. 2007. “A diagnostic approach for going beyond panaceas.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 104, no. 39 (September): 15181-15187.

______. 2009. “A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems.” Science 325, no. 5939 (July): 419-422.

Ostrom, Elinor, y T. K. Ahn. 2003. “Una perspectiva del capital social desde las ciencias sociales: capital social y acción colectiva.” Revista Mexicana de Sociología 65, no. 1 (enero-marzo): 155-233.

Paavaloa, Jouni. 2007. “Institutions and environmental governance: A reconceptualization.” Ecological Economics 63, no. 1 (June): 93-103.

Panebianco, Angelo. 2009. Modelos de partido. Organización y poder en los partidos políticos. Madrid: Alianza.

Poteete, Amy R., Marco A. Janssen, y Elinor Ostrom. 2012. Trabajar juntos: acción colectiva, bienes comunes y múltiples métodos en la práctica. México: UNAM-CEIICH-CRIM-FCPS-FE-IIEc-IIS-PUMA, IASC-CIDE-Colsan-CONABIO-CCMSS-FCE-UAM.

Rittel, Horst W.J., y Melvin N. Webber. 1993. “Dilemas de una teoría general de planeación.” En Problemas públicos y agenda de gobierno, editado por Luis F. Aguilar Villanueva. México: Miguel Ángel Porrúa (Colección Antologías de Política Pública, Tercera Antología).

Salas, Silvia, Ratana Chuenpagdee, Juan Carlos Seijo, and Anthony Charles. 2007. “Challenges in the assessment and management of small-scale fisheries in Latin America and the Caribbean.” Fisheries Research 87, no. 1 (October): 5-16.

Sarker, Ashutosh, and Tadao Itoh. 2003. “The Nature of the Governance of Japanese Irrigation Common-Pool Resources.” Society & Natural Resources 16 (2): 159-172.

SEMARNAT. s.f. Gasto público ambiental como proporción del producto interno bruto. https://apps1.semarnat.gob.mx:8443/.../COM_GPA.pdf Revisado el 13 de abril, 2021.

Sissenwine, Michael P., and Pamela M. Mace. 2003. “Governance for Responsible Fisheries: an Ecosystem Approach.” In Responsible Fisheries in the Marine Ecosystem. Cambridge, Rome: CABI Publishing-Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).

Stiftung, Bertelsmann. 2009. Sustainable Governance Indicators 2009. Policy Performance and Executive Capacity in the OECD. Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung.

Tarrow, Sidney. 2004. El poder en movimiento. Los movimientos sociales, la acción colectiva y la política. Madrid: Alianza.

Townsend, Ralph. 1995. “Fisheries self-governance: corporate or cooperative structures?” Marine Policy 19, no. 1 (January): 39-45.

______. 2010. “Transactions costs as an obstacle to fisheries self-governance in New Zealand.” The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 54, no. 3 (July): 301-320.

Townsend, Ralph, and Ross Shotton. 2008. “Fisheries self-governance: new directions in fisheries management.” In Case studies in fisheries self-governance. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).

Ventura Patiño, María del Carmen. 2012. “Proceso de autonomía en Cherán. Movilizar el derecho.” Espiral. Estudios sobre Estado y Sociedad 19, no. 55 (septiembre-diciembre): 157-176.

Ware, Alan. 2004. Partidos Políticos y Sistemas de Partido. Madrid: Istmo.

World Bank. 1991. Managing Development: The governance dimension. A Discussion Paper. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

Worm, Boris, Edward B. Barbier, Nicola Beaumont, J. Emmett Duffy, Carl Folke, Benjamin S. Halpern, Jeremy B. C. Jackson, et al. 2006. “Impacts of Biodiversity Loss on Ocean Ecosystem Services.” Science 314, no. 5800 (November): 787-790.

Worm, Boris, Ray Hilborn, Julia K. Baum, Trevor A. Branch, Jeremy S. Collie, Christopher Costello, Michael J. Fogarty, et al. 2009. “Rebuilding Global Fisheries.” Science 325, no. 5940 (July): 578.